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Abstract
An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals
from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and
constraints that di¤er from their developed country counterparts. In
this paper we focus on di¤erences in attitudes to corruption, and how
these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a
developing country context. We show how di¤erences in the investors
level of technology and di¤erences in the host country governments
trade-o¤ between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competi-
tion for the resource and the winning price. We nd that the entry of
a corrupt investor may induce the honest investor to o¤er bribes in-
stead of taxes. Surprisingly, however, our analysis also demonstrates
that under some conditions, the entry of a corrupt investor may in
fact induce the honest investor to increase its tax payments.
Key words: Corruption, FDI, auction, natural resources
JEL classication: K2, K4, O1
1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment ows (FDI) are in ux. An increasing share of
world outward FDI ows originates from developing countries and is hosted
by oil and gas rich developing countries. These developments are illustrated
in Figure 1, tracking the development in the share of world FDI ows from
2000 to 2010, using data from UNCTAD.
Multinationals from developing countries bring not only di¤erent tech-
nologies but potentially also di¤erent attitudes to corruption. Table 1 reports
inclination to bribe abroad, measured by the Bribe PayersIndex (BPI) and
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Figure 1: Yearly FDI ows, as a share of world ows, 2000-2010
the corresponding domestic corruption, measured as the Corruption Percep-
tion Index (CPI), for the top ve and bottom ve BPI countries, with data
from Transparency International (TI). For both measures, a lower number
means more corrupt. The table shows that multinationals from countries
where corruption is pervasive, typically developing and transition economies,
are more likely to bribe abroad.
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Table 1. Corruption at home and bribes abroad
BPI CPI
Less inclined to bribe abroad
Netherlands 8:8 8:9
Switzerland 8:8 8:8
Belgium 8:7 7:5
Germany 8:6 8:0
Japan 8:6 8:0
Average 8:7 8:2
More inclined to bribe abroad
Russia 6:1 2:4
China 6:5 3:6
Mexico 7:0 3:0
Indonesia 7:1 3:0
United Arab Emirates 7:3 6:8
Average 6:8 3:8
Source: Transparency International
A reasonable interpretation of the positive correlation between BPI and
CPI that we observe in Table 1 is that rms located in countries where
corruption is (perceived to be) pervasive face lower risks, both legal and
market based, of bribing abroad. Developed countries have implemented
legislation that forbids foreign bribery.1 In addition, the market response to
corruption, in the form of damaged reputation, drop in share prices, the risk
of class action or debarment from procurement, is likely to vary according to
the multinationalshome countries. This interpretation is consistent with a
recent study of 166 corruption cases by Cheung et al. (2012), which concludes
that rms from countries where managers and/or rms are likely to face
negative reactions to involvement in corruption are less likely to o¤er bribes
abroad.
Hence, the increased share of world FDI originating from developing
and transition countries suggests increased prevalence of corrupt practices
in international investments. This increase in the supplyof corruption is
1Such legislation includes the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public O¢ cials, and parts of
the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). See Transparency International (2012)
for facts about how the legislation is being enforced.
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matched by an increase in the demand for corruption, as an increasing
share of world FDI is hosted by resource rich developing countries, where
corruption is typically prevalent.2
The present paper analyses how the growing importance of developing
country multinationals may a¤ect the competition for natural resources in a
developing country context. The envision a situation with two rms, a devel-
oped country multinational and a developing country multinational, bidding
for an asset sold by a government which places weight on both bribes and
tax income. The developed county multinational is technologically more
advanced than its developing country counterpart, and faces a moral or pe-
cuniary cost of being involved in a corrupt transaction. For short, we shall
sometimes refer to the developed country rm as "honest". Regarding the
developing country multinational, we analyse both the case where it, like the
developed rm, faces a cost of corruption, and when it faces no such cost, in
which case we may refer to it as "corrupt".
One nding from our analysis is that competition with a corrupt investor
may induce the honest investor to also start paying bribes. More surprisingly,
however, we also demonstrate that competition with the corrupt rm under
certain circumstances may lead the honest investor to pay a higher tax to the
host country to acquire the resource. Intuitively, in corrupt host countries,
the corrupt investor may be a tougher competitor to the honest investor,
forcing the latter to raise its tax bid for the resource to compensate for the
disadvantageof not o¤ering a bribe. As long as this is the winning bid, it
is good for the host country, which receives higher tax revenues from a high-
tech investor. But clearly, if the contract is signed with the corrupt rm,
the host country loses, since the investor is low-tech and on top of that pays
lower taxes. We explore which investor wins the contract as well as the terms
of this contract, highlighting the importance of host government emphasis
on bribes, the technology gap between investors, and the competing rms
bribe-aversion as critical factors.
Anecdotal evidence on corruption in natural resources abounds. Consider
for example the tender for a 30-year lease for operating the Aynak mine in
Afghanistan, one of the worlds biggest depositories of copper. A Chinese
rm, MCC, won the contract in competition with 14 international mining
2On the link between resource wealth and institutional quality, see for example
Brunnschweiler (2008), Leite and Weidemann (1999), Gelb (1988), Karl (1997), Ross
(1999), Robinson et al. (2006), McGuirk (2012), Busse and Gröning (2012), Frankel
(2010) and Kolstad and Søreide (2009) provide recent reviews.
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companies, including bids from the United States and Canada. According
to facts about the process and the other bids made public by the Afghan
government, the Chinese clearly outbid the other rms, partly with a high
signature bonus and partly with promises of investments in infrastructure
and a new power plant. However, according to leakages from US intelligence
reports, the Chinese paid a $30 million bribe to the Afghan Minister of Mines.
The Minister had to leave his post shortly after the event, allegedly because of
this corruption. The Chinese now operate the Aynak mine, but have failed to
meet their commitments regarding production, infrastructure developments
and the promised power plant. Tax revenues from the copper production
are far lower than forecasted when the tender took place in 2007. This story
shows how a new investor, in this case from China, uses bribes to outperform
investors from more developed countries, thereby enriching centrally placed
politicians but with a sub-optimal result for the country as a whole.3
Our paper is most closely related to Burguet and Perry (2007), who
analyse a situation where an auctioneer allows a supplier to revise its bid
upon information about other bids and in exchange for a bribe. This, they
nd, has highly distortive consequences in cases when this supplier is weaker
in terms of what quality it can o¤er. When the briber is also the ex ante
strongest rm with regard to technology, the distortion is primarily on the
price o¤ered to the buyer, which they nd can be lower in the case of corrup-
tion compared to the case of no corruption. Also Burguet and Che (2004),
analyzing the impact of corruption on contract allocation, nd that e¢ cient
rms pay an overly high burden in competition with less honest rms. They
nd corruption to distort the allocative outcome of procurement, meaning
that a bribe may compensate for signicant technological inferiority, i.e. cor-
ruption makes it possible for less e¢ cient rms to win contracts. Other
related literature includes Søreide (2009), which analyses how attitudes to
risk may a¤ect corrupt behavior, and Engel et al. (2012) who consider asym-
metric punishment and corruption.
3The story was reported by for instance Afghanistan News Center and Washington
Post, both on November 18, 2009. For more case studies, see Yates (1996) on Gabon,
Soares de Oliveira (2007) on Angola or Gboyega et al. (2010) on Nigeria. For details
of how corruption in petroleum is carried out, see McPherson and Searraigh (2007), Al
Kasim et al. (2008) and Rose-Ackerman (1997, 1999). For journalistic investigations of
how allocation of oil and gas concessions to rms have been inuenced by diplomatic
pressures, see Shaxson (2007). For an overview of US investigated corruption cases by
sector and country, see www.fcpamap.com.
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Our contribution adds to this literature by focusing on how the host coun-
try decision-makers trade-o¤ between personal and social benets inuences
contract allocation and prices. The e¤ect of bribe-biased preferences on the
auction outcome is far from trivial. For instance, we demonstrate that equi-
librium bribes may be lower in a setting where the politician focuses narrowly
on bribes compared to a situation where the politician places a larger weight
on social outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model with the case of (a) symmetric and (b) asymmetric propensity
to o¤er bribes, Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium outcome, while Section 4
concludes.
2 Model
A developing country is auctioning out a license to explore a natural resource,
such as an oil eld. The government of this country values bribes (B) and
taxes (t) that are derived from the auction, according to the following utility
function:
U = !B + (1  !) t; (1)
where ! is the weight placed on bribes relative to tax income. Taxes
should be interpreted broadly to include any benets that accrue to society
from the sale of the resource. We envision a setting where the decision
maker can freely determine the allocation of the resource and the terms
of the contract, without risking any repercussions. The decision maker may,
however, place a positive weight on the welfare of the population, for instance
to boost his popularity and reduce the risk of rebellion. In other words, even
a highly corrupt dictator is likely to have a ! lower than one.
Two rms are interested in making a bid for the license. Firm is objective
function is given by:
i = i   (Bi + ti)  fi; (2)
where the rst term is the gross revenues from the resource (i), as de-
termined by the investors technology, the second term is acquisition costs,
consisting of bribes (Bi) and taxes (ti), and the third term is the burden fi,
moral or pecuniary (in expected terms), of paying a bribe.
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Competition for the resource is structured as a second price auction, with
the winner being the player with the higher bid, and with the acquisition price
given by the bid of the losing party. Note that the price may consist of both
a bribe and a tax, and is dened in terms of government utility, see Bjorvatn
and Søreide (2005).
We focus on two potential asymmetries between the rms; technology and
aversion to corruption. For concreteness, let rm a be the technologically
more advanced rm, and let a = 1; b =  < 1. We can think of rm
a as a developed country multinational and rm b as a developing country
multinational. As discussed above, the developed country multinational is
likely to face stronger pressure not to be involved in corruption. We model
this as fa > 0, and sometimes refer to this as the honest rm. Note, however,
that even the honest rm in our setting may be involved in corruption, if the
gains of a corrupt deal outweigh the (expected ) costs. We discuss both the
case where the developing country multinational is honest, that is, fb = fa >
0, and when it is corrupt, that is, when fb = 0.
2.1 Competition between two honest rms
We start out by analyzing the case where the two rms are equally bribe
sensitive, fa = fb = f . In this case, it is clear that the more e¢ cient rm a
necessarily wins the auction, so the question is; how does it win the auction?
To answer this question, we rst consider what rm bs maximum bid is.
Clearly, if rm b makes a tax bid, the maximum government utility that it
can generate is Umaxb (t
max
b ) = (1  !) , where tmaxb = : Alternatively, the
maximum bribe bid that rm b can o¤er would generate government utility
Umaxb (B
max
b ) = ! (   f), where Bmaxb =    f . Hence, we know that rm b
when o¤ering its maximal bid is indi¤erent between paying bribes and taxes
when:
 =
f!
2!   1  1: (3)
For  > 1, it makes a bribe bid, while for   1, it makes a tax
bid. Note that 1 is a decreasing function of !; the more weight the host
government places on bribes, the more likely it is that rm b o¤ers a bribe.
Also note that a higher  pulls in the direction of o¤ering a bribe; the bribe
aversion becomes relatively less important when the economic stakes involved
in the auction increase, reected by a higher .
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In the second price auction, rm a wins the contract by matching the
government utility of rm bs maximal bid. As we have seen above, the
maximal bid of rm b is the tax bid tmaxb =  for   1, and the bribe bid
Bmaxb =   f for  > 1. Starting with the former case, that is,   1, the
winning tax bid by rm a would be such that Ua (ta) = Umaxb (t
max
b ), which
can be expressed as (1  !) ta = (1  !) , which solving for ta gives the
equilibrium tax bid:
ta (t
max
b ) = : (4)
Alternatively, it could win by o¤ering a bribe bid determined by Ua (Ba) =
Umaxb (t
max
b ), which can be expressed as !Ba = (1  !) , which gives the
equilibrium bribe bid:
Ba (t
max
b ) =
 (1  !)
!
: (5)
Plugging these values, ta and B

a, into rm as prot function, we nd
that it is indi¤erent between the two when  = 1, and strictly prefers to
make the tax bid ta when  < 1. This implies that whenever rm b chooses
to make a bribe bid, so does rm a. Turning to the case of  > 1 we can
derive rm as winning bid from the condition Ua (Ba) = Umaxb (B
max
b ), which
equals !Ba = ! (   f), which solving for Ba can be expressed as:
Ba (B
max
b ) =    f: (6)
Hence, in the symmetric bribe aversion case we can conclude that:
Observation 1. For   1, rm a wins the contract by o¤ering a tax
ta (t
max
b ) =  while for  > 1 rm a wins the contract by o¤ering a bribe
Ba (B
max
b ) =    f .
Evidently, even an honest, technologically superior rm may not neces-
sarily win the contract by taxes alone. If the decision maker in the host
country is su¢ ciently corrupt, the investor may be tempted to win the deal
by o¤ering a bribe instead of the tax, with the price discount associated
with the corrupt transaction more than outweighing the investors moral or
expected pecuniary costs.
2.2 Competition between an honest and a corrupt rm
We now introduce asymmetric bribe aversion. In order for there to be an
interesting trade-o¤ between the two rms in the auction, we assume that
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the advanced rm a has a higher aversion against paying bribes than its less
advanced rival, for instance due to stricter anti-corruption legislation in the
home country of the advanced rm. Let fb = 0, while fa = f > 0.
In this case, it is not obvious which rm wins the contract; rm a clearly
has the higher ability to bribe, but rm b has the higher willingness to bribe.
Note, however, that this trade-o¤only applies for ! > 1
2
, since in this case the
government actually values bribes more than taxes. For !  1
2
, the auction
is trivial; rm a wins by o¤ering a tax that is equal to the maximal bid by
rm b, that is, ta = . In the following, therefore, we limit ourselves to the
situation of ! > 1
2
.
2.2.1 The winner
We start by considering the maximal bid by rm b. Clearly, since rm b
has no aversion to paying bribes, and since bribes, given our assumption of
! > 1
2
, are more e¢ cient in generating government utility than paying taxes,
rm b always o¤ers a bribe bid. The maximum utility it can generate is
Umaxb (B
max
b ) = !.
Turning to rm a, by making a tax bid it can generate Umaxa (t
max
a ) =
(1  !), while by making a bribe bid it can generate Umaxa (Bmaxa ) = ! (1  f).
The tax bid of rm amatches the bid of rm b when Umaxa (t
max
a ) = U
max
b (B
max
b ),
which can be expressed as:
 =
1  !
!
 2: (7)
The bribe bid by rm a matches the bid by rm b when Umaxa (B
max
a ) =
Umaxb (B
max
b ), which can be expressed as:
 = 1  f  3: (8)
Hence, when  > max (2; 3) rm b wins the bid, while for   max (2; 3),
rm a wins the bid. Not surprisingly, the larger is the weight on bribe income
in the host governments objective function, and the larger are the honest
rms costs of paying bribes, the more likely it is that the corrupt rm wins
the contract for any level of technology.
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2.2.2 The price
Now that we have established the conditions for who wins the auction, we
turn to the equilibrium price. Given that rm a wins, does it pay a tax
or a bribe? Note that a winning bribe bid by rm a would be such that
Ua (Ba) = U
max
b (B
max
b ), which can be stated as !Ba = !, or simply:
Ba (B
max
b ) = !: (9)
Alternatively, the winning tax bid by rm a would be such that Ua (ta) =
Umaxb (B
max
b ), which can be stated as (1  !) ta = !, implying that:
ta (B
max
b ) =
!
1  ! : (10)
Plugging these into rm as prot function, we nd that a is indi¤erent
between the two, i.e., a (Ba ) = a (t

a ), when:
 =
f (1  !)
2!   1  4: (11)
Hence, we can conclude that:
Observation 2. Given that rm a wins the contract, for   4 it does
so by o¤ering a tax ta (B
max
b ) =
!
1 ! , while for  > 4 it does so by o¤ering
a bribe Ba (B
max
b ) = !.
What about when rm b wins the contract, that is, for  > max (2; 3)?
We know that rm a is indi¤erent between o¤ering a bribe and a tax as its
maximal bid when Umaxa (B
max
a ) = U
max
a (t
max
a ), which can be expressed as.
! =
1
2  f  !1: (12)
where we have used the fact that Bmaxa = 1  f and tmaxa = 1. That is, for
!  !1 the maximal o¤er by rm a is dened by a tax bid, while for ! > !1
the maximal o¤er by rm a is dened by a bribe bid. Hence, for !  !1,
rm b wins by o¤ering a bribe such Ub (Bb) = Umaxa (t
max
a ), which simplies
to:
Bb (t
max
a ) =
1  !
!
: (13)
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Note that the equilibrium bribe is falling in !, since a higher ! reduces
the value of rm as tax bid. For ! > !1, rm b wins by o¤ering a bribe such
that Ub (Bb) = Umaxa (B
max
a ), which can be expressed as:
Bb (B
max
a ) = 1  f: (14)
In this case, therefore, the bribe is constant, independent of !.
Observation 3. Given that rm b wins the contract, for !  !1 it
does so by o¤ering a bribe Bb (t
max
a ) =
1 !
!
, while for ! > !1 it does so by
o¤ering a bribe Bb (B
max
a ) = 1  f .
3 Analysis
The equilibrium outcome of the competition for resources in this corrupt
environment is illustrated in Figure 2. The gure shows the critical levels
of  dened in equations (3), (7), (8) and (11), and !1 from equation (12),
for a given level of f . The di¤erent constellations of equilibrium buyer and
price are marked with di¤erent capital letters (A-D) in the gure, with the
properties of each area detailed in Table 2.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium buyer and price
Table 2 summarizes the key information from the various areas marked
in Figure 2.
Table 2. Winner, taxes, and bribes
Area in Figure 1 A B C D E
Two honest rms
Winner a a a a a
Bribe 0 0 0    f 0
Tax    0 
Honest and corrupt rms
Winner a a b b b
Bribe 0  1  f 1  f 1 !
!
Tax !
1 ! 0 0 0 0
In area A, rm a wins the auction. Interestingly, taxes are now increasing
in !, the governments emphasis on bribes. In fact, taxes are higher when
competing against a corrupt rm (ta =
!
1 ! ) than when competing against
another honest rm (ta = ). The reason is that competition for assets
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sold by a corrupt government places the corrupt rm at an advantage. To
compensate for the rivals advantage, the honest rm may have to pay a
higher tax.
In area B, too, rm a wins the auction. But, while it wins by o¤ering a
tax (ta = ) when competing against another honest rm, it wins by o¤ering
a bribe (Ba = ) when competing against a corrupt rm. Note, therefore,
that areas A and B are radically di¤erent when it comes to how the type of
competition a¤ects the equilibrium outcome: In area A, competing against
a corrupt rm leads to increased taxes. In area B; however, it leads to the
complete erosion of taxes.
In area C rm a wins the competition against an honest rival but not
against a corrupt competitor. Again, competition with a corrupt rm com-
pletely erodes taxation, and in this case also leads to an ine¢ cient outcome,
in the sense that the low-tech rm wins the auction.
In area D, rm a wins the auction when competing against an honest
rival (this time by o¤ering a bribe), while it loses when competing against a
corrupt rival. In the former case, rm a wins by o¤ering a bribe Ba =   f ,
while in the latter case, the corrupt rival wins by o¤ering Bb = 1 f . Clearly,
the level of bribes is higher in the latter case.
In area E rm a wins over an honest rival, and does so by paying a tax
(ta = ). In contrast, a corrupt rival wins over a and does so by paying
a bribe (Bb = 1 !! ). Note that the bribe is falling in !; in e¤ect, a more
bribe-focused host government increases the comparative advantage of the
corrupt rm, allowing it to o¤er a lower bribe and still win the contract.
4 Conclusion
The rise of transition and developing country multinationals presents new
challenges to multinationals headquartered in the developed world and new
possibilities for (more or less) corrupt governments in resource rich countries.
Developing country investors are likely to be disadvantaged in terms of tech-
nology, but may be more willing and able to o¤er bribes to access resources
abroad. Our analysis shows how this asymmetric competition plays out in
an auction for a resource in a corrupt host country. We analyze who wins the
auction and whether the payment is in the form of taxes or bribes, focusing
on how the technology gap between investors and the degree of government
corruption a¤ect the outcome.
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Not surprisingly, the entry of a corrupt investor may make a corrupt deal
more likely, especially if the technological gap is not too wide and if the host
government places a large weight on bribes relative to taxes. By reducing tax
income and lowering the quality of investments, corruption may thus erode
the positive welfare e¤ects that could have been derived from the natural
resource. More surprisingly, however, our analysis shows that competition
with a corrupt investor does not necessarily lead to higher bribes and lower
taxes compared the situation with two honest investors. In fact, given that
the government is not too corrupt, the developed country investor wins the
contract by o¤ering higher taxes than it would have done competing against
another honest investor.
In a larger perspective, our paper can be seen as shedding light on the
mechanisms underlying the so-called resource curse, that is, the negative link
between natural resource and economic development, which is particularly
evident for countries with weak institutions. We have shown why corruption
may lead to a loss of tax revenues and the use of less e¢ cient technology
for a country auctioning out a license to explore its resources. Clearly, these
distortions may have macroeconomic implications. Moreover, as shown by
Asiedu and Lien (2011), Robinson et al. (2006) and others, corruption in
resource related FDI may have a negative impact also on the institutional
development of a country, with damaging impacts on its long-term growth
potential.
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